Political stuff from the Brand Reilly DUI thread

[cm husker]

 

 

 

 

 

 

Is there uber in Lincoln yet? In today's world there's no reason to you should ever be in this position.

Yes, the problem is surge-pricing. 10-15 min. rides that may cost $10 at 2:00 p.m. cost $80 at 2:00 a.m. So, it's not the most reasonable option, even though it is certainly (and obviously) better than getting a DUI.

Sometimes that's true, but not always. And the cool thing about on demand services is that uber drivers will start to flex to those high demand periods, thus driving the price down.

 

If I were a low wage earner and could make an extra $200 per weekend driving drunks home from the bar, I'd consider it.

 

That's very true - the theory is as surge-pricing goes up, more drivers are incentivized to go online and drive prices down.

 

However, in my experience, and that of my friends, a lot of people taking an Uber at 2:00 a.m. on a weekend are still having to drop in the $50-$60 plus range. I know someone who had a $102 bill for a 15 min. ride this past weekend. That's why many people I know, who are relying on an Uber, take some more personal responsibility and will often try to get one around 1:15 a.m. to 1:30 a.m. when it's cheaper.

 

Good Lord....why not just take a normal cab?

 

In college, we would lots of times take a cab TO the bar so that nobody would drive home. At the end of the night, just call another one and boom....you're home.

 

Sure as heck didn't cost $60 -100.

 

 

How long ago were you in college?

 

The reason I ask is that just 20 years ago, that would be a $40 to $65 dollar in 1996 dollars.

 

late 80s.

 

 

Yeah, so in 1988, that's a $30 to $50 ride; in some ways, it's crazy how much cheaper equivalent goods and services are despite core inflation increases. It's what those who hate profit incentives just don't understand. The drive for profit actually drives the cost down and quality up of goods and services.

 

It will be interesting to see where Uber prices go when gasoline costs climb again.

[Guy Chamberlin]

 

It's what those who hate profit incentives just don't understand. The drive for profit actually drives the cost down and quality up of goods and services.

 

 

 

It can. Or the most profit-driven companies in the world can create exciting new products like bundled derivatives and lose 14 trillion dollars of other people's money overnight.

 

Most people don't hate profit incentives. Just simplistic political bromides.

[cm husker]

 

 

It's what those who hate profit incentives just don't understand. The drive for profit actually drives the cost down and quality up of goods and services.

 

 

 

It can. Or the most profit-driven companies in the world can create exciting new products like bundled derivatives and lose 14 trillion dollars of other people's money overnight.

 

Most people don't hate profit incentives. Just simplistic political bromides.

 

 

Where did you find the $14tn figure? That strikes me as high when talking about actual losses after the recovery. Anyway, we can head over to the politics board, but it was a divorcing of risk from consequence, which was caused by many things, including in significant part by government intervention and regulation prior to the meltdown. Profit motives may have driven individual risk taking incentives, but if people who had been borrowing debt, lending debt and selling bonds related to that debt had been required to maintain that risk, then it would have been avoided.

 

But even if we accept that profit motive was the primary cause (and not the systemic issues specific to that market), there's no efficient way for government to pick and choose the "right" level of profitability, implement the associated required regulations and enforce them in a meaningful way.

To do so would cost the economy trillions in growth; a loss that would be just as real, if not as tangible, as the "overnight" losses of '08.

[NUance]

 

 

 

It's what those who hate profit incentives just don't understand. The drive for profit actually drives the cost down and quality up of goods and services.

 

 

 

It can. Or the most profit-driven companies in the world can create exciting new products like bundled derivatives and lose 14 trillion dollars of other people's money overnight.

 

Most people don't hate profit incentives. Just simplistic political bromides.

 

 

Where did you find the $14tn figure? That strikes me as high when talking about actual losses after the recovery. Anyway, we can head over to the politics board, but it was a divorcing of risk from consequence, which was caused by many things, including in significant part by government intervention and regulation prior to the meltdown. Profit motives may have driven individual risk taking incentives, but if people who had been borrowing debt, lending debt and selling bonds related to that debt had been required to maintain that risk, then it would have been avoided.

 

But even if we accept that profit motive was the primary cause (and not the systemic issues specific to that market), there's no efficient way for government to pick and choose the "right" level of profitability, implement the associated required regulations and enforce them in a meaningful way.

To do so would cost the economy trillions in growth; a loss that would be just as real, if not as tangible, as the "overnight" losses of '08.

 

 

Not sure where the $14 trillion figure came from. It's a big number. But it might actually be low. Check this out:

 

By 2007, the international financial system was trading derivatives valued at one quadrillion dollars per year. This is 10 times the total worth, adjusted for inflation, of all products made by the world's manufacturing industries over the last century. LINK

 

 

The thing is, the whole financial derivative crisis of 2007-08 is so complicated it's hard to figure out what caused it all, and what took place. Michael Lewis (Liar's Poker, The Blind Side) wrote an excellent book on the topic that I'd highly recommend: The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine. He's one of my favorite authors. :

[cm husker]

I read the big short, and I like Mike Lewis, who I've had a chance to meet by acquaintance and have heard speak in a small setting. I thought he rushed that book to press for timing reasons and didn't get it right overall, but the personal aspects of the story were outstanding.

 

Personally, I think it's going to take decades to fully understand what happened. And it's important to not lose sight of how valuable the derivative market is to financial and real production growth in terms of liquidity, risk reduction (shockingly) and signalling.

 

Anyway, really interesting discussion; sorry if derailing thread. Happy to turn back to Reilly and DUIs.

 

Question: should a coach consider the impact a punishment has on innocent team members when assigning punishments to individuals? For example, if this were TA against MSU last year and the charge was suspicion of DUI, should he be suspended even if that likely means a loss to the rest of the guys?

 

Or if it might mean the difference between a win providing a coach with security versus a loss leading directly to his firing? At 4-8, that might have been a real possibility.

 

I don't think it's a simple answer.

[cm husker]

Just a ps on the derivatives discussion: here's a good read from a branch of the fed reserve:

 

https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/publications/business-review/1997/january-february/brjf97ks.pdf

[cm husker]

 

Should Reilly be punished more harshly than Randy Gregory for his repeated failed drug tests?

 

Yeah, he should.

 

Because Reilly made everybody else on that highway share the risks of his poor decision making.

A counter to that is that buying illegal drugs directly finances suffering in all sorts of places, unless he bought from Colorado et al producers, which is unlikely.

[Elf]

 

 

 

Is there uber in Lincoln yet? In today's world there's no reason to you should ever be in this position.

Yes, the problem is surge-pricing. 10-15 min. rides that may cost $10 at 2:00 p.m. cost $80 at 2:00 a.m. So, it's not the most reasonable option, even though it is certainly (and obviously) better than getting a DUI.

 

Sometimes that's true, but not always. And the cool thing about on demand services is that uber drivers will start to flex to those high demand periods, thus driving the price down.

 

If I were a low wage earner and could make an extra $200 per weekend driving drunks home from the bar, I'd consider it.

 

That's very true - the theory is as surge-pricing goes up, more drivers are incentivized to go online and drive prices down.

 

However, in my experience, and that of my friends, a lot of people taking an Uber at 2:00 a.m. on a weekend are still having to drop in the $50-$60 plus range. I know someone who had a $102 bill for a 15 min. ride this past weekend. That's why many people I know, who are relying on an Uber, take some more personal responsibility and will often try to get one around 1:15 a.m. to 1:30 a.m. when it's cheaper.

 

Where I'm at demand usually starts to drop off by 2:15 and surge/prime time pricing is mostly gone by 2:30.

 

I make far more than "$200 per weekend" driving folks around.

[Guy Chamberlin]

I read the big short, and I like Mike Lewis, who I've had a chance to meet by acquaintance and have heard speak in a small setting. I thought he rushed that book to press for timing reasons and didn't get it right overall, but the personal aspects of the story were outstanding.

 

 

Just to confirm: professional financial journalist Michael Lewis and the dozens of in-the-trenches financial experts he interviewed missed the overall meaning of the 2008 global credit crisis.

 

But you didn't.

[Guy Chamberlin]

 

But even if we accept that profit motive was the primary cause (and not the systemic issues specific to that market), there's no efficient way for government to pick and choose the "right" level of profitability, implement the associated required regulations and enforce them in a meaningful way.

To do so would cost the economy trillions in growth; a loss that would be just as real, if not as tangible, as the "overnight" losses of '08.

 

 

It used to be simple and worked for decades: if you were an investment bank or securities trader, you could do pretty much whatever you wanted with other people's money. They understood the risk. If you were a commercial bank, you had to be reasonably liquid at all times, which is why you couldn't dabble with securities and speculation. If you were an insurance company, you wouldn't even dream of doing what AIG did.

 

It was of course reckless Wall Street speculation that devastated the economy back in the Great Depression. That's where Glass-Steagall came from. Everyone fluent in America's boom and bust banking history predicted what would happen if the regulation was repealed.

 

It's hard to deny the profit-motive issues in the 2008 meltdown. There were enough smart guys to know the derivative bundle was doomed to collapse in a massive way, but no one wanted to be the guy who killed the short-term profit.

[cm husker]

 

 

I read the big short, and I like Mike Lewis, who I've had a chance to meet by acquaintance and have heard speak in a small setting. I thought he rushed that book to press for timing reasons and didn't get it right overall, but the personal aspects of the story were outstanding.

 

Just to confirm: professional financial journalist Michael Lewis and the dozens of in-the-trenches financial experts he interviewed missed the overall meaning of the 2008 global credit crisis.

 

But you didn't.

He didn't miss it. He simply overstated certain roles and simplified it fit within a more compelling story.

 

Also, I'm not the only one to question some of the conclusions in the book, so it's not those experts versus 1.

 

But interesting mischaracterization.

[cm husker]

 

 

 

 

But even if we accept that profit motive was the primary cause (and not the systemic issues specific to that market), there's no efficient way for government to pick and choose the "right" level of profitability, implement the associated required regulations and enforce them in a meaningful way.

To do so would cost the economy trillions in growth; a loss that would be just as real, if not as tangible, as the "overnight" losses of '08.

It used to be simple and worked for decades: if you were an investment bank or securities trader, you could do pretty much whatever you wanted with other people's money. They understood the risk. If you were a commercial bank, you had to be reasonably liquid at all times, which is why you couldn't dabble with securities and speculation. If you were an insurance company, you wouldn't even dream of doing what AIG did.

 

It was of course reckless Wall Street speculation that devastated the economy back in the Great Depression. That's where Glass-Steagall came from. Everyone fluent in America's boom and bust banking history predicted what would happen if the regulation was repealed.

 

It's hard to deny the profit-motive issues in the 2008 meltdown. There were enough smart guys to know the derivative bundle was doomed to collapse in a massive way, but no one wanted to be the guy who killed the short-term profit.

So much wrong and oversimplification here, especially about the Great Depression and glass steagall, including ignoring that glass steagall was the first step in creating the "too big to fail" paradigm.

 

Question for you: what regulation was repealed that lead to OTC derivative products that were at the center of the '08 crash?

 

I'll take your answer on the politics board. Doubt people want to muck up or continue this thread with a banking discussion.

[teachercd]

DUI or ISIS...which is worse and which should be punished more harshly?

 

Reaction!

[Guy Chamberlin]

 

 

 

 

But even if we accept that profit motive was the primary cause (and not the systemic issues specific to that market), there's no efficient way for government to pick and choose the "right" level of profitability, implement the associated required regulations and enforce them in a meaningful way.

To do so would cost the economy trillions in growth; a loss that would be just as real, if not as tangible, as the "overnight" losses of '08.

It used to be simple and worked for decades: if you were an investment bank or securities trader, you could do pretty much whatever you wanted with other people's money. They understood the risk. If you were a commercial bank, you had to be reasonably liquid at all times, which is why you couldn't dabble with securities and speculation. If you were an insurance company, you wouldn't even dream of doing what AIG did.

 

It was of course reckless Wall Street speculation that devastated the economy back in the Great Depression. That's where Glass-Steagall came from. Everyone fluent in America's boom and bust banking history predicted what would happen if the regulation was repealed.

 

It's hard to deny the profit-motive issues in the 2008 meltdown. There were enough smart guys to know the derivative bundle was doomed to collapse in a massive way, but no one wanted to be the guy who killed the short-term profit.

So much wrong and oversimplification here, especially about the Great Depression and glass steagall, including ignoring that glass steagall was the first step in creating the "too big to fail" paradigm.

 

Question for you: what regulation was repealed that lead to OTC derivative products that were at the center of the '08 crash?

 

I'll take your answer on the politics board. Doubt people want to muck up or continue this thread with a banking discussion.

 

 

Too much clicking.

 

I'll take my wild guess here: whatever it was, it was Barney Frank's fault.

[cm husker]

No, not Barney Frank's fault. But ironically for your position is that he was a "deregulator" or at least regulation reducer, even though his kickback oriented provisions werent the cause of the meltdown. As a rule, preditory lending and borrowing has been very overstated in what caused the actual meltdown (versus what caused the housing bubble).

 

Even President Obama has specifically stated that derivatives and the repeal of glass steagall were not the cause of the meltdown. Elizabeth Warren acknowledged the same but stated that such misinformation was too valuable "for the cause" to be corrected... Let that sink in.

 

Also, once again in the irony column, the banks that imploded on wall st and started the dominoes (leahmans, bear sterns, et al) were those that didn't even fall under GS to begin with. Those banks that had commercial and investment arms actually fared better because the assets on hand to meet obligations during the collateral calls that doomed other banks and almost crushed the entire system.

 

Oh, and as far as AIG goes, those underwriting policies are not unlike the very "middle man" positions that many regulation proponents are now asking to be required! Except, they'll end up distorting the market and handicapping the economics that would check "bad" bahavior. Weve seen it before, for example, in regulations imposed by the SEC in the 70s that shifted rating agencies from being paid for by investors for their services to an issuer-oriented market.